Saturday, January 30, 2016
ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND CHOICE----Episode 3
THE ERRONEOUS MEANS WE UTILIZE WHEN MAKING
DECISIONS AND CHOICES
Here's an example of using totally uninformative descriptions to make decisions :
Dick is a 30-year-old man. He is married with no children. A man of high ability and high motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field. He is liked by his colleagues.
This description was intended to convey no information relevant to the question of whether Dick is an engineer or a lawyer. Consequently, the probability that Dick is an engineer should equal the proportion of engineers in the group, as if no description had been given. The subjects, however, judged the probability of Dick being an engineer to be .5 regardless of whether the stated proportion of engineers in the group was .7 or .3. Evidently people respond differently when given no evidence and when given worthless evidence. When no specific evidence is given, prior probabilities are properly utilized ; when worthless evidence is given, prior probabilities are ignored.
Insensitivity to sample size . To evaluate the probability of obtaining a particular result in a sample drawn from a specified population, people typically apply the representativeness heuristic. That is, they assess the likelihood of a sample result, for example, that the average height in a random sample of ten men will be 6 feet, by the similarity of this result to the corresponding parameter [that is, to the average height in the population of men] . The similarity of a sample statistic to a population parameter does not depend on the size of the sample. Consequently, if probabilities are assessed by representativeness, then the judged probability of a sample statistic will be essentially independent of sample size. Indeed, when subjects assessed the distributions of average height for sample of various sizes, they produced identical distributions. For example, the probability of obtaining an average height greater than 6 feet was assigned the same value for samples of 1,000, 100, and 10 men. Moreover, subjects failed to appreciate the role of sample size even when it was emphasized in the formulation of the problem. Consider the following question :
A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day. As you know, about 50% og all babies are boys. However, the exact percentage varies from day to day. Sometimes it may be higher than 50%, sometimes lower.
For a period of 1 year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than 60% of the babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think recorded more such days ?
The large hospital [21]
The smaller hospital [21]
About the same [that is, within 5% of each other [53]
The values in parentheses are the number of undergraduate students who chose each answer.
Most subjects judged the probability of obtaining more than 60% boys to be the same in the small and in the large hospital, presumably because these events are described by the same statistic and are therefore equally representative of the general population. In contrast, sampling theory entails that the expected number of days on which more than 60% of the babies are boys is much greater in the small hospital than in the large one, because a large sample is less likely to stray from 50%. This fundamental notion of statistics is evidently not part of people's repertoire of intuitions.
A similar insensitivity to sample size has been reported in judgments of posterior probability, that is, of the probability that a sample has been drawn from one population rather than from another. Consider the following :
imagine an urn filled with balls, of which 2/3 are of one color and 1/3 of another. One individual has drawn 5 balls from the urn, and found that 4 were red and 1 was white. Another individual has drawn 20 balls and found that 12 were red and 8 were white. Which of the two individuals should feel more confidant that the urn contains 2/3 red balls and 1/3 white balls, rather than the opposite ? What odds should each individual give ?
In this problem, the correct odds are 8 to 1 for the 4:1 sample and 16 to 1 for the 12:8 sample, assuming equal prior probabilities. However, most people feel that the first sample provides much stronger evidence for the hypothesis that the urn is predominantly red, because the proportion of red balls is larger in the first than in the second sample. Here again, intuitive judgments are dominated by the sample proportion and are essentially unaffected by the size of the sample, which plays a crucial role in the determination of the actual posterior odds. In addition, intuitive estimates of posterior odds are far less extreme than the correct values. The underestimation of the impact of evidence has been observed repeatedly in problems of this type. It has been labeled "conservatism."
MORE TO COME.
Thursday, January 28, 2016
ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND CHOICE----- Episode 2
THE HEURISTICS THAT ARE EMPLOYED TO ASSESS
PROBABILITIES AND TO PREDICT VALUES
REPRESENTATIVENESS
Many of the probabilistic questions with which people are concerned belong to one of the following types : What is the probability that object A belongs to class B ? What is the probability that event A originates from process B ? What is the probability that process B will generate event A ? In answering such questions people typically rely on the representativeness heuristic, in which probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A is representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles B. For example, when A is highly representative of B, the probability that A originates from B is judged to be high. On the other hand, if A is not similar to B, the probability that A originates from B is judged to be low.
Think back to the example of "Steve who was described
as very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with little interest in people, or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and structure, and a passion for detail. " How do people assess the probability that Steve is engaged in a particular occupation from a list of possibilities [ for example, farmer, salesman, airline pilot, librarian, or physician ?] How do people order these occupations from most to least likely ? In the representativeness heuristic, the probability that Steve is a librarian, for example, is assessed by the degree to which he is representative of, or similar to, the stereotype of a librarian. Indeed, research with problems of this type has shown that people order the occupations by probability and by similarity in exactly the same way. This approach is not influenced by several factors that should affect judgments of probability.
Insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes. One of the factors that has no effect on representativeness but should have a major effect on probability is the prior probability, or base-rate frequency of the outcomes. In the case of Steve, for example, the fact that there are many more farmers than librarians in the population should enter into any reasonable estimate of the probability that Steve is a librarian rather than a farmer. Considerations of base-rate frequency, however, do not affect the similarity of Steve to the stereotypes of librarians and farmers. If people evaluate probability by representativeness, therefore, prior probabilities will be neglected. This hypothesis was tested in an experiment where prior probabilities were manipulated. Students were shown brief personality descriptions of several individuals, allegedly sampled at random from a group of 100 professionals ---- engineers and lawyers. The subjects were asked to assess, for each description, the probability that it belonged to an engineer rather than to a lawyer. In one experimental condition, subjects were told that the group from which the description had been drawn consisted of 70 engineers and 30 lawyers. In another condition, subjects were told that the group consisted of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers. The odds that any particular description belongs to an an engineer rather than to a lawyer should be higher in the first condition, where there is a majority of engineers, than in the second condition, where there is a majority of lawyers. Specifically, it can be shown by applying Bayes' rule that the ratio of these odds should be [.7 / .3--squared], or 5.44, for each for each description. In a sharp violation of Bayes' rule, the subjects in these two conditions produced essentially the same probability judgments. Apparently, subjects evaluated the likelihood that a particular description belonged to an engineer rather than to a lawyer by the degree to which this description was representative of the two stereotypes, with little or no regard for the prior probabilities of the categories.
The subjects used prior probabilities correctly when they had no other information. In the absence of a personality sketch, they judged the probability that an unknown individual is an engineer to be .7 and .3, respectively, in the two base-rate conditions. However, prior probabilities were ignored when a description was introduced even when this description was totally uninformative.
WILL PICK UP HERE.
Wednesday, January 27, 2016
ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND CHOICE
ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND CHOICE
HEURISTIC : adj. ; Enabling a person to discover or learn something for themselves.
BIAS : noun ; Prejudice in favor of or against a thing, person, or group compared with another.
An individual has been described by a neighbor as follows : "Steve is very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful but with little interest in people or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and structure, and a passion for detail." Is Steve likely to be a librarian or a farmer ?
The resemblance of Steve's personality to that of a stereotypical librarian strikes everyone immediately, but equally relevant statistical considerations are almost always ignored. Did it occur to you that there are more than 20 male farmers for each male librarian in the United States ? Because there are so many more farmers, it is almost certain that more "meek and tidy" souls will be found on tractors than at library information desks. However, most people who were questioned ignored the relevant statistical facts and relied exclusively on resemblance. They used as a simplifying heuristic [ sort of like "rule of thumb" ] to make a difficult judgment. The reliance on the heuristic caused predictable biases [ systematic errors] in their predictions.
Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events such the outcome of an election, the guilt of a defendant, or the future of the dollar. These beliefs are usually expressed in statements such as "I think that. . .," "it is unlikely that. . .," and so forth. Occasionally, beliefs concerning uncertain events are expressed in numerical form as odds or subjective probabilities. What determines such beliefs ? How do people assess the probability of an uncertain event or the value of an uncertain quantity ? Scientific experiments show that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.
The subjective assessment of probability resembles the subjective assessment of physical qualities such as distance or size. These judgments are all based on data of limited validity, which are processed according to heuristic rules. For example, the apparent distance of an object is determined by its clarity. The more sharply the object is seen, the closer it appears to be. This rule has some validity, because in any given scene the more distant objects are seen less sharply than nearer objects. However, the reliance on this rule leads to systematic errors in the estimation of distance. Specifically, distances are often overestimated when visibility is poor because the contours of objects are blurrred. On the other hand, distances are often underestimated when visibility is good because the objects are seen sharply. Thus, the reliance on clarity as an indication of distance leads to common biases. Such biases are also found in the intuitive judgment of probability. This missive describes three heuristics that are employed to assess probabilities and to predict values. Biases to which these heuristics lead, and the applied and theoretical implications of these observations will be examined.
REPRESENTATIVENESS
WILL PICK UP HERE.
Friday, January 8, 2016
A LITTLE HISTORY OF SYRIA
BEING MUCH IN THE NEWS, SYRIA SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY US THINKING CITIZENS
Geography of Syria
Syria is a small, poor, and crowded country. On the map, it appears about the size of Washington state or Spain, but only about a quarter of its 185,000 square kilometers is arable land. That is, "economic Syria" is about as large as a combination of Maryland and Connecticut or Switzerland. Most is desert --- some is suitable for grazing but less than 10 percent of the surface is permanent cropland.
Except for a narrow belt along the Mediterranean, the whole country is subject to extreme temperatures that cause frequent dust storms and periodic droughts. Four years of devastating drought from 2006 to 2011 turned Syria into a land like the American "dust bowl" of the 1930s. That drought was said to be the worst ever recorded, but it was one in a long sequence : Just in the period from 2001 to 2010, Syria had 60 "significant" dust storms. The most important physical aspect of these storms, as was the experience in America in the 1930s, was the removal of the topsoil. Politically, they triggered the civil war.
In addition to causing violent dust storms, high temperatures cause a lessening of rainfall. A map of the drought conditions of 2010 shows that, except for small areas of Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon, the whole eastern Mediterranean was severely affected.
Even the relatively favored areas had rainfall of just 8 to 15 inches --- where 8 inches is considered as the absolute minimum to sustain agriculture --- and the national average was less than 4 inches. Worse, rain falls in Syria mainly in the winter months when it is less beneficial for crops. Thus, areas with less than 15 inches are heavily dependent upon irrigation. Ground water [ aquifers] have been so heavily tapped in recent years that the water table in many areas has fallen below what a farmer can access, while the country's main river, the Euphrates, is heavily drawn down by Turkey and Iraq. Consequently, as of the last years before the civil war, only about 13,500 square kilometers could be irrigated.
In recent years, according to the World Bank, agriculture supplied about 20 percent of national income [GDP] and employed about 17 percent of the population. Before the heavy fighting began, Syrian oil fields produced about 330,000 barrels per day, but Syrians consumed all but 70,000 of that amount. Sales supplied about 20 percent of GDP and a third of export earnings. Production subsequently fell by at least 50 percent, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Syria's oil is of poor quality, sour, and expensive to refine. Industry [mainly energy-related] employed about a third of the adult male population and provided a similar percentage of the national income. Before the war, moves were being made to transport oil and gas from farther east across Syria to the Mediterranean. Obviously, these projects have been stopped. Now there is a sort of cottage industry in crude refining of petroleum products for local use and smuggling.
Syria is not just a piece of land ; it is densely populated. In 1946, the total Syrian population was less than 3 million. In 2010, it reached nearly 24 million. Thus, the country offered less than 0.25 hectares [just over a third of an acre] of agricultural land per person. Considering only "agricultural Syria," the population is about five times as dense as Ohio or Belgium, but it does not have Ohio's or Belgium's other means of generating income. If the population were much smaller, Syria could have managed adequately but not, of course, richly.
The bottom line is that the population / resource ratio is out of balance. While there has been a marginal increase of agricultural land and more efficient cropping with better seed, neither has kept up with the population growth. Moreover, as the number of people in the country has increased, they have been unable to agree on how to divide up what they have. So it is important to understand how their "social contract" --- their view of their relationship with one another and with government --- evolved and then shattered.
THE SYRIAN HERITAGE
Since before history was written, Syria has been fought over by foreign empires ---Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, Macedonian Greeks, Romans, Mongols, Turks, British, and French. Only during the Umayyad Caliphate in the 7th and 8th centuries was it the center of an empire.But that relatively short period left Syria with Islamil heritage. For many centuries, the society has been overwhelmingly Muslim.
Syria also has historically been a sanctuary for little groups of peoples whose differences from one another were defined in religious and / or ethnic terms. Several of these communities were "leftovers" from previous invasions or migrations. During most of the last five centuries, when what is today Syria was part of the Ottoman Empire, groups of Orthodox, Catholic, and other Christians ; Alawis, Ismailis, and other sorts of Shia Muslims; and Yazidis, Kurds, Jews, and Draze lived in enclaves and neighborhoods in the various cities and towns alongside Sunni Muslim Arabs.
During Ottoman rule the population was organized in two overlapping ways. First, there was no "Syria" in the sense of a nation-state, but rather provinces that were centered on the ancient cities. The most important of these were Damascus, which may be the oldest city in the world today, and Aleppo. The concept of a state, much less a nation-state, did not enter into political thought until the end of the 19th century. Inhabitants of the various parts of what became Syria could move without feeling or being considered alien from one province of the Ottoman Empire to the next. Thus, if the grandfathers or great-grandfathers of people alive today were asked about what entity they belonged to, they would probably have named the city or village where they paid their taxes.
Second, its centuries of rule, the Ottoman Empire generally was content to have its subjects live by their own codes of behavior. It did not have the means or the incentive to intrude into their daily lives. Muslims, whether Turks or Arabs or Kurd, shared with their imperial government Islamic mores and law. Other ethnic / religious "nations" [Turkish] were self-governing except in military and foreign affairs.
Whether in enclaves or in neighborhoods, each non-Muslim community dressed according to its custom, spoke its own languages and lived according to its unique cultural pattern ; it appointed or elected its own officials, who divided the taxes it owed to the empire, ran its schools, and provided such health care facilities and social welfare as it thought proper or could afford. Since this system was spelled out in the Quran and the Traditions [Hadiths] of the Prophet, respecting it was legally obligatory for Muslims. Consequently, when the Syrian state took shape, it inherited a rich, diverse, and tolerant social tradition.
MORE TO COME. STAY TUNED.
Geography of Syria
Syria is a small, poor, and crowded country. On the map, it appears about the size of Washington state or Spain, but only about a quarter of its 185,000 square kilometers is arable land. That is, "economic Syria" is about as large as a combination of Maryland and Connecticut or Switzerland. Most is desert --- some is suitable for grazing but less than 10 percent of the surface is permanent cropland.
Except for a narrow belt along the Mediterranean, the whole country is subject to extreme temperatures that cause frequent dust storms and periodic droughts. Four years of devastating drought from 2006 to 2011 turned Syria into a land like the American "dust bowl" of the 1930s. That drought was said to be the worst ever recorded, but it was one in a long sequence : Just in the period from 2001 to 2010, Syria had 60 "significant" dust storms. The most important physical aspect of these storms, as was the experience in America in the 1930s, was the removal of the topsoil. Politically, they triggered the civil war.
In addition to causing violent dust storms, high temperatures cause a lessening of rainfall. A map of the drought conditions of 2010 shows that, except for small areas of Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon, the whole eastern Mediterranean was severely affected.
Even the relatively favored areas had rainfall of just 8 to 15 inches --- where 8 inches is considered as the absolute minimum to sustain agriculture --- and the national average was less than 4 inches. Worse, rain falls in Syria mainly in the winter months when it is less beneficial for crops. Thus, areas with less than 15 inches are heavily dependent upon irrigation. Ground water [ aquifers] have been so heavily tapped in recent years that the water table in many areas has fallen below what a farmer can access, while the country's main river, the Euphrates, is heavily drawn down by Turkey and Iraq. Consequently, as of the last years before the civil war, only about 13,500 square kilometers could be irrigated.
In recent years, according to the World Bank, agriculture supplied about 20 percent of national income [GDP] and employed about 17 percent of the population. Before the heavy fighting began, Syrian oil fields produced about 330,000 barrels per day, but Syrians consumed all but 70,000 of that amount. Sales supplied about 20 percent of GDP and a third of export earnings. Production subsequently fell by at least 50 percent, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Syria's oil is of poor quality, sour, and expensive to refine. Industry [mainly energy-related] employed about a third of the adult male population and provided a similar percentage of the national income. Before the war, moves were being made to transport oil and gas from farther east across Syria to the Mediterranean. Obviously, these projects have been stopped. Now there is a sort of cottage industry in crude refining of petroleum products for local use and smuggling.
Syria is not just a piece of land ; it is densely populated. In 1946, the total Syrian population was less than 3 million. In 2010, it reached nearly 24 million. Thus, the country offered less than 0.25 hectares [just over a third of an acre] of agricultural land per person. Considering only "agricultural Syria," the population is about five times as dense as Ohio or Belgium, but it does not have Ohio's or Belgium's other means of generating income. If the population were much smaller, Syria could have managed adequately but not, of course, richly.
The bottom line is that the population / resource ratio is out of balance. While there has been a marginal increase of agricultural land and more efficient cropping with better seed, neither has kept up with the population growth. Moreover, as the number of people in the country has increased, they have been unable to agree on how to divide up what they have. So it is important to understand how their "social contract" --- their view of their relationship with one another and with government --- evolved and then shattered.
THE SYRIAN HERITAGE
Since before history was written, Syria has been fought over by foreign empires ---Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, Macedonian Greeks, Romans, Mongols, Turks, British, and French. Only during the Umayyad Caliphate in the 7th and 8th centuries was it the center of an empire.But that relatively short period left Syria with Islamil heritage. For many centuries, the society has been overwhelmingly Muslim.
Syria also has historically been a sanctuary for little groups of peoples whose differences from one another were defined in religious and / or ethnic terms. Several of these communities were "leftovers" from previous invasions or migrations. During most of the last five centuries, when what is today Syria was part of the Ottoman Empire, groups of Orthodox, Catholic, and other Christians ; Alawis, Ismailis, and other sorts of Shia Muslims; and Yazidis, Kurds, Jews, and Draze lived in enclaves and neighborhoods in the various cities and towns alongside Sunni Muslim Arabs.
During Ottoman rule the population was organized in two overlapping ways. First, there was no "Syria" in the sense of a nation-state, but rather provinces that were centered on the ancient cities. The most important of these were Damascus, which may be the oldest city in the world today, and Aleppo. The concept of a state, much less a nation-state, did not enter into political thought until the end of the 19th century. Inhabitants of the various parts of what became Syria could move without feeling or being considered alien from one province of the Ottoman Empire to the next. Thus, if the grandfathers or great-grandfathers of people alive today were asked about what entity they belonged to, they would probably have named the city or village where they paid their taxes.
Second, its centuries of rule, the Ottoman Empire generally was content to have its subjects live by their own codes of behavior. It did not have the means or the incentive to intrude into their daily lives. Muslims, whether Turks or Arabs or Kurd, shared with their imperial government Islamic mores and law. Other ethnic / religious "nations" [Turkish] were self-governing except in military and foreign affairs.
Whether in enclaves or in neighborhoods, each non-Muslim community dressed according to its custom, spoke its own languages and lived according to its unique cultural pattern ; it appointed or elected its own officials, who divided the taxes it owed to the empire, ran its schools, and provided such health care facilities and social welfare as it thought proper or could afford. Since this system was spelled out in the Quran and the Traditions [Hadiths] of the Prophet, respecting it was legally obligatory for Muslims. Consequently, when the Syrian state took shape, it inherited a rich, diverse, and tolerant social tradition.
MORE TO COME. STAY TUNED.
Thursday, January 7, 2016
WAHHABISM IS A CONSERVATIVE WING OF SUNNI ISLAM THAT'S HEADQUARTERED IN SAUDI ARABIA
WAHHABISM IS BEING USED AGAINST OTHER MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS ALIKE TO SUBJUGATE
WOMEN AND CRUSH DISSENT
In 2014, Saudi liberal activist Raif Badawi was sentenced to 1,000 lashes, 10 years in prison, and a heavy fine for insulting Islam. In fact, his crime was to establish an online discussion forum where people were free to speak about religion and criticize religious scholars.
He had been charged with "apostasy" in 2012, because of his writings and for hosting discussion on his Saudi Arabian Liberals website, and was sentenced to seven years in prison and 600 lashes but on appeal a heavier sentence was imposed.
Mr. Radawi appealed the verdict, but it was complicated by the fact that his lawyer and brother-in-law, Waleed Abulkhair, was himself in jail. He was detained without explanation in 2014 when on trial for damaging the image of the kingdom and breaking his allegiance to the king. Under Saudi Arabia's harsh Sharia code, almost any critical word or deed makes a person liable to severe punishment.
Lashings and beheadings generally get little publicity except where a foreigner is involved. The local media is muzzled and foreign press for the most part excluded. This contrasts with the blanket coverage of the kidnapping of more than 200 Nigerian schoolgirls by Boko Haram, the Al-Qa'ida type movement in northern Nigeria.
Heavy coverage was also given to the introduction by the Sultan of Brunei, of a new, supposedly more Islamic, penal code. Hassan al Bolkiah said said in May 2014 : "Tomorrow will see the enforcement of Sharia law phase one." Later phases were to include flogging, amputation of limbs and death by stoning.
No such legal innovations were necessary in Sudan, where, in May of 2014, Marim Yahia Ibrahim Ishag was sentenced in Khartoum to be hanged for apostasy after first receiving 100 lashes. Born a Muslim but raised a Christian, she was given three days by a judge "to return to Islam" or be executed. The 100 lashes were apparently because she was married to a Christian and was eight months pregnant with their child.
Of these four events the one that has received least international attention is the sentence imposed on Mr. Badawi. This is a pity, because it is the spreading influence of Wahhabism, the fundamentalist, exclusive and intolerant Islamic creed of Saudi Arabia, that is a common feature in the deepening sectarianism, regressive legislation and mistreatment of women in the Islamic world.
The "Wahhabization" of mainstream Sunni Islam is one of the most dangerous developments of our era. Ali Allawi, the historian and authority on sectarianism, says that in country after country, Sunni communities "have adopted tenets of Wahhabism that were not initially part of their canon." Other Islamic believers such as the Shia are denounced as apostates or heretics who are no longer Muslims.
A crucial feature in the rise of Wallabism is the financial and political might of Saudi Arabia. Dr. Allawi says that if, for example, a pious Muslim wants to found a seminary in Bangladesh, there are not many places he can obtain $40,000 other than from Saudi Arabia. But if the same person wants to oppose Wahhabism, then he will have "to fight with limited resources." The result is deepening sectarianism as Shia are targeted as non-Muslims, and non-Muslims of all descriptions are forced to flee, so that countries such as Iraq and Syria are being emptied of Christians who have lived in them for almost 2,000 years.
Dr. Allawi says it is naive to imagine that small Shia minorities in countries such as Malaysia and Egypt were not frowned upon in the past by the majority Sunni, but it is only recently that they have been ostracized and persecuted. He says that many Shia now live with a sense of impending doom "like Jews in Germany in 1935. " As with European anti-Semitic propaganda down the ages, Shia are demonized for supposedly carrying out abominable practices such as ritual incest : in a village near Cairo in 2013, four Shia men were murdered by a mob while carrying out their usual religious ceremonies in a private house.
"The Wahhabi try to ignore the entire corpus of Islamic teaching over the last 1,400 years," says Dr. Allawi. The ideology of al-Qa'ida type movements in Iraq and Syria are not the same as Wahhabism, but their beliefs are SIMILAR though carried to a greater extreme. There are bizarre debates about whether it is forbidden to clap or whether women should wear bras. As with Boko Haram in Nigeria, militants in Iraq and Syria see no religious prohibition in enslaving women as spoils of war.
There are signs that the Saudi rulers may now be coming to regret giving quite so much support to the jihadists trying to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. In 2014, they invited the Iranian foreign minister to visit the kingdom. But it was too late : having had their government denounce Mr. Assad as the root of all evil in Syria. Saudi jihadists would have seen it as a betrayal and the height of hypocrisy should the state have threatened them with prison terms when they returned home.
The Saudi rulers are not the only hypocrites involved. Western governments express horror at what happens in Nigeria or Iraq but are diplomatically mute when it comes to Saudi Arabia. Sharia law is disregarded as an exotic and traditional, if unpleasant, part of local culture which should not interfere in the business of securing lucrative arms contracts ---- some $87 billion-worth impending for the U.S. alone.
Of course, there are other reasons for the spread of Wahhabism and its tenets. It gives absolute governments a capacity to secure and legitimize their power by treating their critics as irreligious. Religious justification for lashing is limited, but its opponents can be portrayed as attacking Islam. Fomenting sectarianism between Sunni and Shia diverts attention from the failings of authoritarian rule.
A creed such as Wahhabism is useful to many movements because its exclusivity justifies any brutal action against an opponent. In Chechnya, semi-criminalized bands of fighters against the Russians, known as Wahhabies, used their fundamentalist religious beliefs to excuse banditry and kidnapping.
The ever-increasing impact of Wahhabism over Sunni Islam is a disaster, the effects of which are felt from the villages of northern Nigeria to the courts of Khartoum and the Sultanate of Brunei. It has everywhere produced persecution of minorities, subjugation of women, and the crushing of dissent.
In a prophetic description of this trend, an Afghan editor denounced jihadi leaders in Kabul in 2003 as "holy fascists misusing Islam as an instrument to take over power." Unsurprisingly, he was accused of insulting Islam and forced to flee abroad.
WOMEN AND CRUSH DISSENT
In 2014, Saudi liberal activist Raif Badawi was sentenced to 1,000 lashes, 10 years in prison, and a heavy fine for insulting Islam. In fact, his crime was to establish an online discussion forum where people were free to speak about religion and criticize religious scholars.
He had been charged with "apostasy" in 2012, because of his writings and for hosting discussion on his Saudi Arabian Liberals website, and was sentenced to seven years in prison and 600 lashes but on appeal a heavier sentence was imposed.
Mr. Radawi appealed the verdict, but it was complicated by the fact that his lawyer and brother-in-law, Waleed Abulkhair, was himself in jail. He was detained without explanation in 2014 when on trial for damaging the image of the kingdom and breaking his allegiance to the king. Under Saudi Arabia's harsh Sharia code, almost any critical word or deed makes a person liable to severe punishment.
Lashings and beheadings generally get little publicity except where a foreigner is involved. The local media is muzzled and foreign press for the most part excluded. This contrasts with the blanket coverage of the kidnapping of more than 200 Nigerian schoolgirls by Boko Haram, the Al-Qa'ida type movement in northern Nigeria.
Heavy coverage was also given to the introduction by the Sultan of Brunei, of a new, supposedly more Islamic, penal code. Hassan al Bolkiah said said in May 2014 : "Tomorrow will see the enforcement of Sharia law phase one." Later phases were to include flogging, amputation of limbs and death by stoning.
No such legal innovations were necessary in Sudan, where, in May of 2014, Marim Yahia Ibrahim Ishag was sentenced in Khartoum to be hanged for apostasy after first receiving 100 lashes. Born a Muslim but raised a Christian, she was given three days by a judge "to return to Islam" or be executed. The 100 lashes were apparently because she was married to a Christian and was eight months pregnant with their child.
Of these four events the one that has received least international attention is the sentence imposed on Mr. Badawi. This is a pity, because it is the spreading influence of Wahhabism, the fundamentalist, exclusive and intolerant Islamic creed of Saudi Arabia, that is a common feature in the deepening sectarianism, regressive legislation and mistreatment of women in the Islamic world.
The "Wahhabization" of mainstream Sunni Islam is one of the most dangerous developments of our era. Ali Allawi, the historian and authority on sectarianism, says that in country after country, Sunni communities "have adopted tenets of Wahhabism that were not initially part of their canon." Other Islamic believers such as the Shia are denounced as apostates or heretics who are no longer Muslims.
A crucial feature in the rise of Wallabism is the financial and political might of Saudi Arabia. Dr. Allawi says that if, for example, a pious Muslim wants to found a seminary in Bangladesh, there are not many places he can obtain $40,000 other than from Saudi Arabia. But if the same person wants to oppose Wahhabism, then he will have "to fight with limited resources." The result is deepening sectarianism as Shia are targeted as non-Muslims, and non-Muslims of all descriptions are forced to flee, so that countries such as Iraq and Syria are being emptied of Christians who have lived in them for almost 2,000 years.
Dr. Allawi says it is naive to imagine that small Shia minorities in countries such as Malaysia and Egypt were not frowned upon in the past by the majority Sunni, but it is only recently that they have been ostracized and persecuted. He says that many Shia now live with a sense of impending doom "like Jews in Germany in 1935. " As with European anti-Semitic propaganda down the ages, Shia are demonized for supposedly carrying out abominable practices such as ritual incest : in a village near Cairo in 2013, four Shia men were murdered by a mob while carrying out their usual religious ceremonies in a private house.
"The Wahhabi try to ignore the entire corpus of Islamic teaching over the last 1,400 years," says Dr. Allawi. The ideology of al-Qa'ida type movements in Iraq and Syria are not the same as Wahhabism, but their beliefs are SIMILAR though carried to a greater extreme. There are bizarre debates about whether it is forbidden to clap or whether women should wear bras. As with Boko Haram in Nigeria, militants in Iraq and Syria see no religious prohibition in enslaving women as spoils of war.
There are signs that the Saudi rulers may now be coming to regret giving quite so much support to the jihadists trying to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. In 2014, they invited the Iranian foreign minister to visit the kingdom. But it was too late : having had their government denounce Mr. Assad as the root of all evil in Syria. Saudi jihadists would have seen it as a betrayal and the height of hypocrisy should the state have threatened them with prison terms when they returned home.
The Saudi rulers are not the only hypocrites involved. Western governments express horror at what happens in Nigeria or Iraq but are diplomatically mute when it comes to Saudi Arabia. Sharia law is disregarded as an exotic and traditional, if unpleasant, part of local culture which should not interfere in the business of securing lucrative arms contracts ---- some $87 billion-worth impending for the U.S. alone.
Of course, there are other reasons for the spread of Wahhabism and its tenets. It gives absolute governments a capacity to secure and legitimize their power by treating their critics as irreligious. Religious justification for lashing is limited, but its opponents can be portrayed as attacking Islam. Fomenting sectarianism between Sunni and Shia diverts attention from the failings of authoritarian rule.
A creed such as Wahhabism is useful to many movements because its exclusivity justifies any brutal action against an opponent. In Chechnya, semi-criminalized bands of fighters against the Russians, known as Wahhabies, used their fundamentalist religious beliefs to excuse banditry and kidnapping.
The ever-increasing impact of Wahhabism over Sunni Islam is a disaster, the effects of which are felt from the villages of northern Nigeria to the courts of Khartoum and the Sultanate of Brunei. It has everywhere produced persecution of minorities, subjugation of women, and the crushing of dissent.
In a prophetic description of this trend, an Afghan editor denounced jihadi leaders in Kabul in 2003 as "holy fascists misusing Islam as an instrument to take over power." Unsurprisingly, he was accused of insulting Islam and forced to flee abroad.
Wednesday, January 6, 2016
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED STATES & BRITAIN
CONTINUATION FROM E-MAIL OF 1-5-2016
PERTAINING TO SAUDIA ARABIA -- U.S.
RELATIONSHIP
Memories of how the Saudis and Opec deliberately triggered an economic crisis in the west in retaliation for U.S aid to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur war still rankle. Manipulation of the oil price for political ends has been a common occurrence since. In 2008, as the world financial crisis hit, former U.S. president G.W. Bush personally requested Abdullah to cut oil prices, and was flatly rebuffed.
The mood regarding human rights has also changed. In 1980, a British television documentary, Death of A Princess, based on the true story of Princess Misha' al and her lover, who were publicly executed for adultery, led the Saudis to expel Britain's ambassador and impose sanctions, much to the London establishment's discomfiture. Many countries bowed to intense pressure not to broadcast the film. Nowadays such bullying is not so easy. Yet while the external environment has altered radically, inside Saudi Arabia itself, as campaigners testify, little, if anything, has changed. Intolerance of dissent, be it political, religious or ideological, remains almost total. Saudi jails are crowded with those whose only crime is to speak freely.
Curbs on women's rights have not relaxed significantly, despite promises dating back to the 1990-91 Gulf wars, when Riyadh was running scared of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and cried out for western help. If anyone believed King Salman would take a different tack, those hopes were quickly dispelled when the first public beheading took place under his reign.
The growing gulf between Saudi Arabia and its more skeptical western partners is nowhere more apparent than in the key area of security and defense cooperation, upon which the relationship was founded in 1915. The west has long viewed the Saudis s a pillar of stability in an unruly region. But Saudi policy since the 1980s has repeatedly given the lie to that over-hopeful analysis.
It was the Saudis, principally, who, encouraged by the U.S., funded the mujahideen in Afghanistan in their fight against Soviet occupation. But it was also the conservative Wahhabi Sunni Muslim establishment and their oil-rich billionaire supporters who went on to channel cash and arms to what morphed into the Taliban, who paid for the Madrassa religious school system in Pakistan that produced new generations of extremists, and whose intolerant and anti-western views laid the ideological ground for the creation of al-Qaida, led by a Saudi citizen, Osama bin Laden.
It is the Saudis, according to regional and American reports, who helped create IS in Syria and Iraq, again by funneling arms and cash. It was the unelected, despotic Saudi regime that, terrified by the implications of the Arab spring, opposed pro-democracy movements in Egypt and elsewhere, and energetically assisted in the brutal suppression of Shia Muslim reforms in Bahrain.
And it was the Saudis who, in improbable alliance with Binyamin Netanyahu's Israel, lobbied most forcefully against any American nuclear deal, or broader Western rapprochement with Shia Iran, their sworn enemy.
Far from bolstering stability, Saudi policy actively works against western attempts to end the standoff with non-Arab Iran ---still the natural regional partner for the U.S and Britain that it was before the 1979 revolution [that kicked out the Shah and installed the Ruhollah Khomeini ] . In Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and across the Gulf, the Saudi's age-old proxy war with Iran, formerly Persia, poisons hopes of peace.
They offer "intelligence sharing" and token forces when the obvious reality, after CHARLIE HEBDO, is that the Islamist jihadist terrorism threatening Europe has now replaced Tehran-backed Bashar al-Assad as the west's main security concern ----and is the product, to a large degree, of the Saudi's repeat mistakes.
To maintain its hold on western governments, the Saudi regime continues to hold out the prospect of lucrative arms purchases, such as the billion-dollar deal with BAE SYSTEMS to supply Eurofighter Typhoon jets. This despite the deeply unsavory legacy of the Al-Yamamah bribery scandal, which revealed corruption on a scale previously unheard of in Britain.
To keep its grip, the Saudi regime uses its network of official and personal to U.S. and Britain's gullible congressional politicians, and to business and investment leaders overly impressed by the Saudi regime's $1 trillion [with a T ] in cash reserves and its global investment portfolio.
But in the end it all comes down to values, not money or weapons or insider influence within the U.S. congress or British parliament. A sea-change is under way with which governmental authorities have yet to catch up. What was tolerable or ignoble 30 years ago is no longer so.
Happily, attitudes in American and British societies, especially on individual rights, have shifted. Unhappily, in Saudi Arabia, they have not -----not yet. But change there, too, is inescapable. The medieval game of thrones that is the absolutist Saudi system cannot endure. An unlikely 100-year-long affair is finally petering out.
MORE TO COME. STAY TUNED.
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