OBJECTIONS TO THE LIBERTARIAN LOGIC AND THE 
          RESPONSES OF THE LIBERTARIANS THERETO

Objection 1 : Taxation is not as bad as forced labor. 

   If you are taxed, you can always choose to work less and pay lower taxes, but if you are forced to labor, you have no such choice. 

   Libertarian reply : Well, yes. But why should the state force you to make that choice ? Some people like watching sunsets, while others prefer activities that cost money --- going to the movies, eating out, sailing on yachts, and so on. Why should people who prefer leisure be taxed less than those who prefer activities that cost money ?
   Consider this situation : A thief breaks into your home, and has time to take either your $1,000 flat-screen television or the $1,000 in cash you have hidden in your mattress. You might hope he steals the television, because you could then choose whether to spend $1,000 to replace it. If the thief stole the cash, he would leave you no such choice (assuming it's too late to return the television for a full refund). But this preference for losing the television (or working less) is beside the point ; the thief (and the state ) do wrong in both cases, whatever adjustments the victims might make to mitigate the losses. 

Objection 2 : The poor need the money more. 

   Libertarian reply : Maybe so. But this is a reason to persuade the affluent to support the needy through their own free choice. It does not justify forcing Michael Jordan and Bill Gates to give to charity. Stealing from the rich and giving to the poor is still stealing, whether it's done by Robin Hood or the state.

   Consider this situation : Just because a patient on dialysis needs one of my kidneys more than I do (assuming I have two healthy ones ) doesn't mean he has a right to it. Nor may the state lay claim to one of my kidneys to help the dialysis patient, however urgent and pressing his needs may be. Why not ? Because it's mine. Needs don't trump my fundamental right to do what I want with the things I own. 

Objection 3. Michael Jordan doesn't play alone. He therefore owes a debt to those who contribute to his success. 

   Libertarian reply : It's true that Jordan's success depends on other people. Basketball is a team sport. People would not have paid $31 million to watch him shoot free-throws by himself on an empty court. He could have made all that money without teammates, coaches, trainers, referees, broadcasters, stadium maintenance workers, and so on. 
   But these people have already been paid the market value of their services. Although they make less than Jordan, they voluntarily accepted compensation for the jobs they perform. So there is no reason to suppose that Jordan owes them a portion of his earnings. And even if Jordan owes something to his teammates and coaches, it is hard to see how this debt justifies taxing his earnings to provide food stamps for the hungry or public housing for the homeless. 

Objection 4 : Jordan is not really being taxed without his consent. As a citizen of a democracy, he has a voice in making the tax laws to which he is subject. 

   Libertarian reply : Democratic consent is not enough. Suppose Jordan voted against the tax, but it passed anyway. Wouldn't the IRS still insist that he pay ? It certainly would. You might argue that by living in this society, Jordan gives his consent (at least implicitly) to abide by the majority's will and obey the laws. But does this mean that simply by living here as citizens, we write the majority a blank check, and consent in advance to all laws, however unjust ?
   If so, the majority may tax the minority, even confiscate its wealth and property against its will. What then becomes of individual rights ? If democratic consent justifies the taking of property, does it also justify the taking of my liberty ? May the majority deprive me of freedom of speech and of religion, claiming that, as a democratic citizen, I have already given my consent to whatever it decides ?
   The libertarian has a ready response to each of the first four objections. But a further objection is less easy to dismiss. 

Objection 5 : Jordan is lucky. 

   He is fortunate to possess the talent to excel at basketball, and lucky to live in a society that prizes the ability to soar through the air and put a ball through a hoop. No matter how hard he has worked to develop his shills, Jordan cannot claim credit for his natural gifts, or for living at a time when basketball is popular and richly rewarded. These things are not his doing. So it cannot be said that he is morally entitled to keep all the money his talents reap. The community does him no injustice by taxing his earnings for the public good. 

   Libertarian reply : This objection questions whether Jordan's talents are really his. But this line of argument is potentially dangerous. If Jordan is not entitled to the benefits that result from the exercise of his talents, then he doesn't really own them. And if he doesn't own his talents and skills, then he doesn't really own himself. But if Jordan doesn't own himself, who does ? Are you sure you want to attribute to the political community a property right in its citizens ? 

   The notion of self-ownership is appealing, especially for those who seek a strong foundation for individual rights. The idea that I belong to myself, not to the state or political community, is one way of explaining why it is wrong to sacrifice my rights for the welfare of others. We hesitate to push a man off a train bridge for the purpose of derailing a runaway train that's headed toward five workers who will be killed if struck by the train. Don't we hesitate to push him because we recognize that his life belongs to him ? Had the man on the bridge jumped to his death to save the workers on the track, few would object. It is, after all, his life. But his life is not for us to take and use, even for a good cause. If four people are stranded in a lifeboat and starving, and three make a decision to kill the sickest of the crew and eat his flesh, most people would say that's wrong. If the sick crewman chooses to sacrifice his life to save his starving shipmates, most people would say he has a right to do so. But his mates have no right to help themselves to a life that does not belong to them. 
   Many who reject laissez-faire economics invoke the idea of self-ownership in other domains. This may explain the persisting appeal of libertarian ideas, even for people who are sympathetic to the welfare state. Consider the way self-ownership figures in arguments about reproductive freedom, sexual morality, and privacy rights. Government should not ban contraceptives or abortion, it is often said, because women should be free to decide what to do with their own bodies. The law should not punish adultery, prostitution, or homosexuality, many argue, because consenting adults should be free to choose their sexual partners for themselves. Some favor markets in kidneys for transplantation on the grounds that I own my own body, and should therefore be free to sell my body parts. Some extend this principle to defend a right to assisted suicide. Since I own my own life, I should be free to end it if I wish, and to enlist a willing physician (or anyone else) to assist. The state has no right to prevent me from using my body or disposing of my life as I please. 
   The idea that we own ourselves figures in many arguments for freedom of choice. If I own my body, my life, and my person, I should be free to do whatever I want with them (provided I don't harm others). Despite the appeal of this idea, its full implications are not easy to embrace. 

   The next post will consider specific cases that might apply the libertarian principles, yet make one scratch her head in the process.