IN THE 1950s, THE U.S. BEGAN POKING ITS NOSE INTO THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, TELLING THEM HOW TO RUN THEIR BUSINESS & REMOVING REGIMES THAT DIDN'T DO AS THE U.S. DEMANDED
In 1954, events of significance were unfolding in Vietnam. In April, Ho Chi Minh's peasant liberation army, commanded by General Vo Nguyen Giap, and peasant supporters hauled extremely heavy antiaircraft guns, mortars, and howitzers through seemingly impassable jungle and mountain terrain to lay siege to desperate French forces at Dien Bien Phu . Incredibly, the United States was then paying 80 percent of the French costs to keep the colonialists in power. Eisenhower explained in August 1953, "when the United States votes $400,000,000 to help that war, we are not voting a giveaway program. We are voting for the cheapest way that we can prevent the occurrence of something that would be of a most terrible significance to the United States of America, our security, our power and ability to get certain things we need from the riches of the Indonesia territory and from Southeast Asia." He envisioned countries in the region falling like dominoes, ultimately leading to the loss of Japan. Nixon agreed :"If Indochina falls, Thailand is put in an almost impossible position. The same is true of Malaya with its rubber and tin. The same is true of Indonesia. If this whole part of Southeast Asia goes under Communist domination or Communist influence, Japan, who trades and must trade with this area in order to exist, must inevitably be oriented towards the Communist regime." And U.S News & World Report cut entirely through any rhetoric about fighting for the freedom of oppressed peoples and admitted, "One of the world's richest areas is open to the winner in Indochina. That's behind U.S, concern. . . tin, rubber, rice, key strategic raw materials are what the war is really about. The U.S. sees it as a place to hold---at any cost."
The French asked for help. Though Eisenhower ruled out sending U.S. ground forces, he and Dulles considered various options to stave off an imminent French defeat. Pentagon officials drew up plans for Operation Vulture, an air campaign against Viet Minh positions. They also discussed the possibility of using two or three atomic bombs. Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining later commented :
what [Radford and I] thought would be ---and I still think would have been a good idea---was to take three small tactical A-bombs----it's a fairly isolated area. . . You could take all day to drop a bomb, make sure you put it in the right place. No opposition. And clean those Commies out of there and the band could play the "Marseillaise" and the French would come marching out of Dien Bien Phu in fine shape. And those Commies would say, "Well, those guys may do this again to us. We'd better be careful."
Eisenhower discussed the use of atomic bombs with Nixon and Robert Cutler of the NSC on April 30, 1954. Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and other French officials reported that Dulles had offered them two atomic bombs one week earlier. Eisenhower and Dulles later disputed such reports, but the use of atomic bombs would certainly have been consistent with U.S. policy at the time. Neither the British nor the French thought this wise or feasible. Evidence also suggests that the "new weapons" were vetoed because the Viet Minh at Dein Bien Phu were too close to French soldiers, who would be put into harm's way. As Eisenhower told Walter Cronkite in 1961, "we were not willing to use weapons that could have destroyed the area for miles and that probably would have destroyed Dien Bien Phu."
Many scholars believe Eisenhower's and Dulles's disclaimers, but the United States' offer is mentioned in diaries and memoirs of French General Paul Ely, Foreign Minister Bidault, and Foreign Ministry Secretary General Jean Chauvel. France's interior minister had asked Premier Laniel to request the bombs. McGeorge Bundy also thinks it likely that Dulles raised the possibility with Bidault, as Bidault claimed, in part because the alleged offer coincided precisely with Dulles's comments to NATO about the necessity of making nuclear weapons conventional. In late April, the Policy Planning Staff of the NSC again discussed the prospect of using nuclear weapons. When Robert Cutler broached the subject with Eisenhower and Nixon, the record indicates that they again considered giving a few of the "new weapons" to the French. Years later, Eisenhower's recollection was quite different. He told his biographer Stephen Ambrose that he had replied to Cutler, "You boys must be crazy. We can't use those awful things against Asians for the second time in less than ten years. My God."
Although no nuclear weapons were used at this time, Eisenhower did approve the Joint Chief' recommendation that should the Chinese intervene, the United States would respond with atomic bombs, not ground troops.
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