Reagan decided to protect the United States from incoming missiles by building a high-tech, futuristic atmospheric shield around the nation. But such a seemingly benign defensive shield, if it worked at all, would have done little to protect against a Soviet first strike, it might have offered a measure of protection against a limited retaliatory attack by a Soviet Union already crippled by a U.S. first strike.
Reagan also understood how easily a crisis could be provoked. In September 1963, when Soviet military personnel mistakenly took a Korean Air Lines passenger jet that had crossed into Soviet airspace for a spy plane and, after unheeded warnings, shot it down, killing all 269 people on board, including 61 Americans, Reagan railed against "the Korean Air Lines massacre" as an "act of barbarism"and a "crime against humanity." But in his memoirs he drew a different lesson :"If anything, the KAL incident demonstrated how much we needed nuclear arms control : If, as some people speculated, the Soviet pilots simply mistook the airliner for a military plane, what kind of imagination did it take to think of a Soviet military man with his finger close to a nuclear push button making an even more tragic mistake ?"
His concerns about nuclear war came to the fore again the following month. After watching an advance copy of The Day After , he wrote in his diary : "It has Lawrence, Kansas wiped out in a nuclear war with Russia. It is powerfully done ---all $7 mil. worth. t's very effective & left me very depressed." The usually unflappable Reagan remained depressed for days. His advisors became so concerned that they brought in Weinberger's Soviet expert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Policy Richard Perle, to talk sense into him.
Reagan's concerns didn't abate, although Perle and others could sometimes manipulate him into defending a nuclear buildup that was at odds with his deeper wishes. It was also during this time, in the fall of 1983, that he was beginning to grasp that Soviet leaders took his bellicose rhetoric and military escalation seriously and feared that he was preparing for an attack.
His diary entry for November 18 was revealing. he worried about the Soviets being "so paranoid about being attacked" that he planned to reassure them that "no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What the h___l have they got that anyone would want." He then noted that Shulz would appear on ABC following The Day After, but now he was more concerned about making sure the film didn't further fuel the already strong public opposition to his nuclear policies : "We know it's 'anti-nuke' propaganda but we're goig to take it over & say it shows why we must keep on doing what we are doing." In that same diary entry, he also wrote about "a most sobering experience with Cap. W & Gen. Vessey in the situation room ---a briefing on our complete plan in the event of a nuclear attack."
Reagan later wrote in his memoirs, "Three years hd taught me something surprising about the Russians : Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Perhaps this shouldn't have surprised me, but it did. In fact, I had difficulty accepting my own conclusion at first." When he came to office, it didn't dawn on him that the Soviets could actually fear a U.S. first strike. "But the more experience I had with the Soviet leaders and other heads of state who knew them, the more I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike."
Although Reagan might have found such an idea inconceivable, he did note that "there were still some people at the Pentagon who claimed a nuclear war was 'winnable'." He concluded that they were "crazy," but he was beginning to understand why the Soviets might take them seriously. In October, he suggested to Shulz that "maybe I should go see [Yuri] Andropov and propose eliminating all nuclear weapons."
Reagan also understood how easily a crisis could be provoked. In September 1963, when Soviet military personnel mistakenly took a Korean Air Lines passenger jet that had crossed into Soviet airspace for a spy plane and, after unheeded warnings, shot it down, killing all 269 people on board, including 61 Americans, Reagan railed against "the Korean Air Lines massacre" as an "act of barbarism"and a "crime against humanity." But in his memoirs he drew a different lesson :"If anything, the KAL incident demonstrated how much we needed nuclear arms control : If, as some people speculated, the Soviet pilots simply mistook the airliner for a military plane, what kind of imagination did it take to think of a Soviet military man with his finger close to a nuclear push button making an even more tragic mistake ?"
His concerns about nuclear war came to the fore again the following month. After watching an advance copy of The Day After , he wrote in his diary : "It has Lawrence, Kansas wiped out in a nuclear war with Russia. It is powerfully done ---all $7 mil. worth. t's very effective & left me very depressed." The usually unflappable Reagan remained depressed for days. His advisors became so concerned that they brought in Weinberger's Soviet expert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Policy Richard Perle, to talk sense into him.
Reagan's concerns didn't abate, although Perle and others could sometimes manipulate him into defending a nuclear buildup that was at odds with his deeper wishes. It was also during this time, in the fall of 1983, that he was beginning to grasp that Soviet leaders took his bellicose rhetoric and military escalation seriously and feared that he was preparing for an attack.
His diary entry for November 18 was revealing. he worried about the Soviets being "so paranoid about being attacked" that he planned to reassure them that "no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What the h___l have they got that anyone would want." He then noted that Shulz would appear on ABC following The Day After, but now he was more concerned about making sure the film didn't further fuel the already strong public opposition to his nuclear policies : "We know it's 'anti-nuke' propaganda but we're goig to take it over & say it shows why we must keep on doing what we are doing." In that same diary entry, he also wrote about "a most sobering experience with Cap. W & Gen. Vessey in the situation room ---a briefing on our complete plan in the event of a nuclear attack."
Reagan later wrote in his memoirs, "Three years hd taught me something surprising about the Russians : Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Perhaps this shouldn't have surprised me, but it did. In fact, I had difficulty accepting my own conclusion at first." When he came to office, it didn't dawn on him that the Soviets could actually fear a U.S. first strike. "But the more experience I had with the Soviet leaders and other heads of state who knew them, the more I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike."
Although Reagan might have found such an idea inconceivable, he did note that "there were still some people at the Pentagon who claimed a nuclear war was 'winnable'." He concluded that they were "crazy," but he was beginning to understand why the Soviets might take them seriously. In October, he suggested to Shulz that "maybe I should go see [Yuri] Andropov and propose eliminating all nuclear weapons."
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