THE AMERICAN EMPIRE AND THE COMING CLASS WAR ---- Episode 24

                 CONTINUING ON WITH THE KOREAN AFFAIR

  At the start of the war, MacArthur and others had advocated using atomic bombs in support of combat operations. "I see here a unique use for the atomic bomb---to strike a blocking blow ---  which would require a six months repair job. Sweeten up my B-29 force," he enthused. General Charles Bolte figured that ten to twenty atomic bombs from the U.S. arsenal could be spared. In July, Truman sent nuclear-configured bombers to Great Britain and Guam. The Joint Chiefs decided, however, that, given the small size of most Korean cities, conventional bombing would suffice. They also expressed concern about Soviet retaliation and public revulsion at such acts. But now, following the entry of the Chinese into the conflict, the United States was desperate and the Chinese offered more suitable targets. Truman stunned the press corps in late November 1950 by announcing that all options, explicitly including atomic devastation, were on the table. 

On the day Truman made his statement, Air Force General George Stratemeyer ordered SAC commander General Hoyt Vandenberg to dispatch atomic-capable bomb groups to the Far East. LeMay volunteered to direct the attacks. Representative Mendel Rivers of South Carolina declared, "If there ever was a time to use the A-bomb, it is now." Senator Owen Brewster from Maine proposed using it against the Chinese. Representative Tom Steed of Oklahoma preferred "the Kremlin." Representative Joseph Bryson of South Carolina just wanted to make sure it was dropped on somebody :"The hour is at hand when every known force, including the atomic bomb, should be promptly utilized." Representative Lloyd Bentsen of Texas proposed that the president "advise the commander of the North Korean troops to withdraw. . . beyond the 38th parallel within one week or use that week to evacuate civilians from a specified list of North Korean cities that will be subjected to atomic attack by the United States Air Force. " 

Gallup found that, by 52 to 38 percent, the public supported using atomic bombs, reversing earlier poll results. UN delegates warned that the Asian people would be "horrified" by such use. Attlee rushed across teh Atlantic to tell Truman that the Europeans shared that horror. Following Attlee's visit, Truman told a group of congressmen that it would be wrong to hit Moscow's surrogates when the Kremlin was the real culprit, but that using atomic bombs against the Soviet Union would provoke retaliation against London, Berlin, and Paris. 

On December 9, 1950, MacArthur requested authorization to use atomic bombs at his discretion. On December 24, he submitted a list of twenty-six targets. He also requested four bombs to drop on invading forces and four more for "critical concentrations of enemy air power." He calculated that dropping thirty to fifty atomic bombs "across the neck of Manchuria" could produce "a belt of radioactive cobalt" that would win the war in ten days. But that was just the short-term effect. The belt of radioactive cobalt would spread "from the Sea of Japan to the YellowSea." Therefore, he figured, "For ay least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Korea from the North." 

While MacArthur was conjuring up visions of atomic Armageddon, others were bemoaning the tremendous setback to the United States' international prestige caused by the debacle in Korea. New York Times correspondents in capitals across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East reported on the "loss of confidence in the United States." In France, "The decline in American prestige has been little short of disastrous." In India, where U.S "prestige has suffered immensely," many people were "secretly pleased to see the Westerners trounced by Asians." Some questioned U.S. ability to halt a Soviet occupation of Europe, given how poorly U.S. forces had performed against China. 

With U.S. and South Korean casualties mounting rapidly, MacArthur began issuing statements from Tokyo blaming others for the military debacle and pushing for all-out war against China. On March 10, 1951, MacArthur requested a "D Day atomic capability" in response to the Soviet bolstering of air capabilities in Korea and Manchuria and a buildup of Chinese forces near the Korean border. "Finletter and Lovett alerted on atomic discussions. Believe everything is set," Vandenberg wrote on March 14. On March 24, 1951, knowing that Truman was pressing for a cease-fire, MacArthur broadcast his own ultimatum to China. Truman bristled, "I'll show that son-of-a-bitch who's boss," but let the incident slide. But when Republican Congressman read to the entire House a letter that MacArthur had written in which he stated that "if we lose this war to Communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable," the Joint Chiefs unanimously recommended that MacArthur be relieved of his command. On April 11, 1951, the White House announced MacArthur's firing. 

MORE TO COME ABOUT THE TRAGEDY OF KOREA AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM.