Heteronomous Determination
{Persons and Things}
It is 3:00 a.m., and you college roommate asks you why you are up late pondering moral dilemmas involving runaway trolleys.
"To write a good paper in Ethics 101," you reply.
"But why write a good paper?" your roommate asks.
"To get a good grade."
"But why care about grades ?"
"To get a job in investment banking."
"But why get a job in investment banking ?"
"To become a hedge fund manager someday."
"But why become a hedge fund manager ?"
"To make a lot of money."
"But why make a lot of money ?"
"To eat lobster, often, which I like. I am, after all, a sentient creature. That's why I'm up late thinking about runaway trolleys."
This is an example of what Kant would call heteronomous determination --- doing something for the sake of something else, for the sake of something else, and so on. When we act heteronomously, we act for the sake of ends given outside us. We are instruments, not authors, of the purposes we pursue.
Kant's notion of autonomy stands in stark contrast to this. When we act autonomously, according to a law we give ourselves, we do something for its own sake, as an end in itself. We cease to be instruments of purposes given outside us. This capacity to act autonomously is what gives human life its special dignity. It marks out the difference between persons and things.
For Kant, respecting human dignity means treating persons as ends in themselves. This is why it is wrong to use people for the sake of the general welfare, as utilitarianism does. Pushing the man off the bridge onto the track to block the trolley uses him as a means, and so fails to respect him as an end in himself. An enlightened utilitarian (such as Mill) may refuse to push the man, out of concern for secondary effects that would diminish utility in the long run. (People would soon be afraid to stand on bridges, etc.) But Kant would maintain that this is the wrong reason to desist from pushing. It still treats the would-be victim as an instrument, an object, a mere means to the happiness of others. It lets him live, not for his own sake, but so that other people can cross bridges without a second thought.
This raises the question of what gives an action moral worth. It takes us from Kant's specially demanding idea of freedom to his equally demanding notion of morality.
WHAT'S MORAL ? LOOK FOR THE MOTIVE
According to Kant, the moral worth of an action consists not in the consequences that flow from it, but in the intention from which the act is done. What matters is the motive, and the motive must be of a certain kind. What matters is doing the right thing because it's right, not for some ulterior motive.
"A good will is not good because of what it effects( Yes, "effects" ) or accomplishes," Kant writes. It is good in itself, whether or not it prevails. "Even if . . . this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions ; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing . . . even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself."
For any action to be morally good,"it is not enough that it should conform to the moral law --- it must also be done for the sake of the moral law." And the motive that confers moral worth on an action is the motive of duty, by which Kant means doing the right thing for the right reason.
In saying that only the motive of duty confers moral worth on an action, Kant is not yet saying what particular duties we have. He is not yet telling us what the supreme principle of morality commands. He's simply observing that, when we assess the moral worth of an action, we assess the motive from which it's done, not the consequences it produces.(Sorry about that, Mr. Hume.)
If we act out of some motive other than duty, such as self-interest, for example, our action lacks moral worth. This is true, Kant maintains, not only for self-interest but for any and all attempts to satisfy our wants, desires, preferences, and appetites. Kant contrasts motives such as these ---he calls them "motives of inclination"---with the motive of duty. And he insists that only actions done out of the motive of duty have moral worth.
How About Some Examples ?
The Calculating Shopkeeper and the Better Business Bureau
Kant offers several examples that bring out the difference between duty and inclination. The first involves a prudent shopkeeper. An inexperienced customer, say, a child, goes into a grocery store to buy a loaf of bread. The grocer could overcharge him --- charge him more than the usual price for a loaf of bread --- and the child would not know. But the grocer realizes that, if others discovered he took advantage of the child in this way, word might spread and hurt his business. For this reason, he decides not to overcharge the child. He charges him the usual price. So the shopkeeper does the right thing, but for the wrong reason. The only reason he deals honestly with the child is to protect his reputation. The shopkeeper acts honestly only for the sake of self-interest ; the shopkeeper's action lacks moral worth.
A modern-day parallel to Kant's prudent shopkeeper can be found in the recruiting campaign of the Better Business Bureau of New York. Seeking to enlist new members, the BBB sometimes runs a full-page ad in the New York Times with the headline "Honesty is the best policy. It's also the most profitable." The text of the ad leaves no mistake about the motive being appealed to.
Honesty. It's as important as any other asset. Because a business that deals in truth, openness, and fair value cannot help but do well. It is toward this end (that) we support the Better Business Bureau. Come join us. And profit from it.
Kant would not condemn the BBB---promoting honest business dealing is commendable. But there is an important moral difference between honesty for its own sake and honesty for the sake of the bottom line. The first is the principled position, the second a prudential one. Kant argues that only the principled position is in line with the motive of duty, the only motive that confers moral worth on an action.
Or consider this example : Some years ago, the University of Maryland sought to combat a widespread cheating problem by asking students to sign a pledge not to cheat. As an inducement, students who took the pledge were offered a discount card good for savings of 10 to 25 percent at local shops. No one knows how many students promised not to cheat for the sake of a discount at the local pizza place. But most of us would agree that bought honesty lacks moral worth. The discounts might or might not succeed in reducing the incidence of cheating. The moral question, however, is whether honesty motivated by the desire for a discount or a monetary reward has moral worth. KANT WOULD SAY NO.
These cases bring out the plausibility of Kant's claim that only the motive of duty --- doing something because it's right, not because it's useful or convenient --- confers moral worth on an action. But two further examples bring out a complexity in Kant's claim.
STAYING ALIVE
The first involves the duty, as Kant sees it, to preserve one's own life. Since most people have a strong inclination to continue living, this duty rarely comes into play. Most of the precautions we take to preserve our lives therefore lack moral content. Buckling our seat belts and keeping our cholesterol in check are prudential acts, not moral ones.
Kant acknowledges that it is often difficult to know what motivates people to act as they do. And he recognizes that motives of duty and inclination may both be present. His point is that the motive of duty --- doing something because it's right, not because it's useful of pleasing or convenient --- confers moral worth on an action. He illustrates this point with the example of suicide.
Most people go on living because they love life, not because they have a duty to do so. Kant offers a case where the motive of duty comes into view. He imagines a hopeless, miserable person so filled with despair that he has no desire to go on living. If such a person summons the will to preserve his life, not from inclination but from duty, then his action has moral worth.
Kant does not maintain that only miserable people can fulfill the duty to preserve their lives. It is possible to love life and still preserve it for the right reason ---namely, that one has a duty to do so. The desire to go on living doesn't undermine the moral worth of preserving one's life, provided the person recognizes the duty to preserve his or her own life, and does so with this reason in mind.
MORE EXAMPLES TO FOLLOW. STAY TUNED.
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