JOHN RAWLS --- happily continued

                             REJECTING MORAL DESERT

   If Rawls's argument about the moral arbitrariness of talents is right, it leads to a surprising conclusion : Distributive justice is not a matter of moral desert.
   He recognizes that this conclusion is at odds with our ordinary way of thinking about justice : "There is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and wealth, and the good things in life generally, should be distributed according to moral desert. Justice is happiness according to virtue . . . Now justice as fairness rejects this conception." 
   Rawls undermines the meritocratic view by calling into question its basic premise, namely, that once we remove social and economic barriers to success, people can be said to deserve the rewards their talents bring them :

     We do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than we deserve our initial starting points in society. That we deserve the superior character that enables us to make the effort to cultivate our abilities is also problematic ; for such character depends in good part upon fortunate family and social circumstances in early life for which can claim credit. The notion of desert does not apply here. 

   If distributive justice is not about rewarding moral desert, does this mean that people work work hard and play by the rules have no claim whatsoever on the rewards they get for their efforts ? No, not exactly. Here Rawls makes an important but subtle distinction ----between moral desert and what he calls "entitlements to legitimate expectations." The difference is this : Unlike a desert claim, an entitlement can arise only once certain rules of the game are in place. It can't tell us how to set up the rules in the first place. 

                  Moral Desert versus Entitlement 

   The conflict between moral desert and entitlements underlies many of our most heated debates about justice : Some say that increasing tax rates on the wealthy deprives them of something they morally deserve ; or that considering racial and ethnic diversity as a factor in college admissions deprives applicants with high SAT scores of an advantage they morally deserve. Others say no --- people don't morally deserve these advantages ; we first have to decide what the rules of the game (the tax rates, the admissions criteria) should be. Only then can we say who is entitled to what.
   Consider the difference between a game of chance and a game of skill. Suppose I play the state lottery. If my number comes up, I am entitled to my winnings. But I can't say that I deserved to win, because a lottery is a game of chance. My winning or losing has nothing to do with my virtue or skill in playing the game. 
   Now imagine the Boston Red Sox winning the World Series. Having done so, they are entitled to the trophy. Whether or not they deserved to win would be a further question. The answer would depend on how they played the games. Did they win by a fluke (a bad call by the umpire at a decisive moment, for example) or because they actually played better than their opponents, displaying the excellence and virtues (good pitching, timely hitting, sparkling defense, etc.) that define baseball at its best ? 
   With a game of skill, unlike a game of chance, there can be a difference between who is entitled to the winnings and who deserved to win. This is because games of skill reward the exercise and display of certain virtues. 
   Rawls argues that distributive justice is not about rewarding virtue or moral desert. Instead, it's about meeting the legitimate expectations that arise once the rules of the game are in place. Once the principles of justice set the terms of social cooperation, people are entitled to the benefits they earn under under the rules. But if the tax system requires them to hand over some portion of their income to help the disadvantaged, they can't complain that this deprives them of something they morally deserve.

     A just scheme, then, answers to what men are entitled to ; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions. But what they are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth. The principles of justice that regulate the basic structure of society . . . do not mention moral desert, and there is no tendency for distributive shares to correspond to it. 

   Rawls rejects moral desert as the basis for distributive justice on two grounds : First, as we've already seen, my having the talents that enable me to compete more successfully than others is not entirely my own doing. But a second contingency is equally decisive : the qualities that a society happens to value at any given time are also morally arbitrary. Even if I had sole, unproblematic claim to my talents, it would still be the case that the rewards these talents reap will depend on the contingencies of supply and demand. In medieval Tuscany, fresco painters were highly valued ; in twenty-first century California, computer programmers are, and so on. Whether my skills yield a lot or a little depends on what the society happens to want.  What counts as contributing depends on the qualities a given society happens to prize. 
   Consider these wage differentials : 

   *The average schoolteacher in the United States makes about $43,000 per year. David Letterman the late-night talk show host, earns $31 million a year. 

   *John Roberts, chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, is paid $223,500 a year. Judge Judy, who has a reality television show, makes $47 million a year. 

   Are these pay differentials fair ? Te answer, for Rawls, would depend on whether they arose within a system of taxation and redistribution that worked to the benefit of the least well off. If so, Letterman and Judge Judy would be entitled to their earnings. But it can't be said that Judge Judy deserves to make two hundred times more than Chief Justice Roberts, or that Letterman deserves to make seven hundred times as much as a schoolteacher. The fact that they happen to live in a society that lavishes huge sums on television stars is their good luck, not something they deserve.