JON RAWLS---continued

                         AN EGALITARIAN NIGHTMARE

   "Harrison Bergeron," is a short story by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., and it describes what might happen in the event of complete egalitarianism.  "The year was 2081," the story begins, "and everybody was finally equal. . . Nobody was smarter than anybody else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. Nobody was stronger or quicker than anybody else." This thoroughgoing equality was enforced by agents of the United States Handicapper General. Citizens of above average intelligence were required to wear mental handicap radios in their ears. Every twenty seconds or so, a government transmitter woud send out a sharp noise to prevent them "from taking unfair advantage of their brains." 
   Harrison Bergeron, age fourteen, is unusually smart, handsome, and gifted, and so has to to be fitted with heavier handicaps than most. Instead of the little ear radio, "he wore a tremendous pair of earphones, and spectacles with thick wavy lenses." To disguise his good looks, Harrison is required to wear "a red rubber ball for a nose, keep his eyebrows shaved off, and cover his even white teeth with black caps at snaggle tooth random." And to offset his physical strength, he has to walk around wearing heavy scrap metal. "In the race of life, Harrison carried three hundred pounds." 
   One day, Harrison sheds his handicaps in an act of heroic defiance against the egalitarian tyranny. To avoid spoiling the story, we'll not get into the conclusion. It should already be clear how Vonnegut's story makes vivid a familiar complaint against egalitarianism. 
   Rawls's theory of justice, however, is not open to that objection. He shows that a leveling equality is not the only alternative to a meritocratic market society. Rawls's alternative, which he calls the DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE, corrects for the unequal distribution of talents and endowments without handicapping the talented. HOW ? Encourage the gifted to develop and exercise their talents, but with the understanding that the rewards these talents reap in the market belong to the community as a whole. Don't handicap the best runners ; let them run and do their best. Simply acknowledge in advance that the winnings don't belong to them alone, but should be shared with those who lack similar gifts. 
   Although the difference principle does not require an equal distribution of income and wealth, its underlying idea expresses a powerful, even inspiring vision of equality : 

     The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out. The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. There is another way to deal with them. The basic structure of society can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate.  

Consider , then, four rival theories of distribution justice : 

   1. Feudal or caste system : fixed hierarchy based on birth.

   2. Libertarian : free market with formal equality of opportunity.

   3. Meritocratic : free market with fair equality of opportunity.

   4. Egalitarian : Rawls's difference principle. 


   Rawls  argues that each of the first three theories bases distributive shares on factors that are are arbitrary from a moral point of view---whether  accident of birth, or social and economic advantage, or natural talents and abilities.Only the difference principle avoids basing the distribution of income and wealth on these contingencies. 
   Although the argument from moral arbitrariness does not rely on the argument from the original position, it is similar in thus respect : Both maintain that, in thinking about justice, we should abstract from, or set aside, contingent facts about persons and their social positions. 

                     A COUPLE OF OBJECTIONS 

   OBJECTION 1 : Incentives 

   Rawls's case for the difference principle invites two main objections. First, what about incentives ? If the talented can benefit from their talents only on terms that help the least well off, what if they decide to work less, or not develop  their skills in the first place ? If tax rates are high or pay differentials small, won't talented people who might have been surgeons go into less demanding lines of work ? Won't Michael Jordan work less hard on his jump shot, or retire sooner than he otherwise might ? 
   Rawls's reply is that the difference principle permits income inequalities for the sake of incentives, provided the incentives are needed  to improve the lot of the least advantaged. Paying CEOs more or cutting taxes on the wealthy simply to increase the gross domestic product would not be enough. But if the incentives generate economic growth that makes those at the bottom better off than they would be with a more equal arrangement, then the difference principle permits them. 
   It is important to notice that allowing wage differences for the sake of incentives is different from saying that the successful have a privileged moral claim to the fruits of their labor. If Rawls is right, income inequalities are just only insofar as they call forth efforts that ultimately help the disadvantaged, not because CEOs or sports stars deserve to make more money than factory workers. 

OBJECTION 2 : Effort

   This brings us to a second, more challenging objection to Rawls's theory of justice : What about effort ? Rawls rejects the meritocratic theory of justice on the grounds that people's natural talents are not their own doing. But what about the hard work people devote to cultivating their talents ? Bill Gates worked long and hard to develop Microsoft. Michael Jordan put in endless hours honing his basketball skills. Notwithstanding their talents and gifts, don't they deserve the rewards their efforts bring ? 
   Rawls replies that even effort may be the product of a favorable upbringing. "Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is dependent upon happy family and social circumstances." Like other factors in our success, effort is influenced by contingencies for which we can claim no credit."It seems clear that the effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously." 
   When Professor Sandel's students encounter Rawls's argument about effort, many strenuously object. They argue that their achievements, including their, admission to Harvard, reflect their own hard work, not morally arbitrary factors beyond their control. Many view with suspicion any theory of justice that suggests we don't morally deserve the rewards our efforts bring us. 
   Afrer Prof Sandel and his students debate Rawls's claim about effort, Sandel conducts an unscientific survey. He points out that psychologists say that birth order has an influence on effort and striving ---such as the effort the students associate with getting into Harvard. The first-born reportedly have a stronger work ethic, make more money, and achieve more conventional success than their younger siblings. These studies are controversial, and most folks question whether their findings are true. But just for the fun of it, Prof Sandel asks his students how many are first in birth order. About 75 to 80 percent raise their hands. The resukt has been the same every time the poll has bee taken.
   No one claims that being first in birth order is one's own doing. If something as morally arbitrary as birth order can influence our tendency to work hard and strive conscientiously, then Rawls may have a point. Even effort can't be the basis of moral desert. 
   The claim that people deserve the rewards that come from effort and hard work is questionable for a further reason : although proponents of meritocracy often invoke the virtues of effort, they don't really believe that effort alone should be the basis of income and wealth. Consider two construction workers. One is strong and brawny, and can build four walls in a day without breaking a sweat. The other is weak and scrawny, and can't carry more than two bricks at a time. Although he works very hard, it takes him a week to do what his muscular co-worker achieves, more or less effortlessly, in a day. No defender of meritocracy would say the weak but hardworking worker deserves to be paid more, in virtue of his superior effort, than the strong one.
   Or consider Michael Jordan. Its true, he practiced hard. But some lesser basketball players practice even harder. No one would say they deserve a bigger contract tan Jordan's as a reward for all the hours they put in. So, despite the talk about effort, it's really contribution, or achievement, that the meritocrat believes is worthy of reward. Whether or not our work ethic is our own doing, our contribution depends, at least in part, on natural talents for which we can claim no credit.