KANT AND JUSTICE

                                               

   Unlike Aristotle, Bentham, and Mill, Kant wrote no major work of political theory, only some essays. And yet, the account of morality and freedom that emerges from his ethical writings carries powerful implications for justice. Although Kan't work does not work out the implications in detail, the political theory he favors rejects utilitarianism in favor of a theory of justice based on a social contract.
   First, Kant rejects utilitarianism, not only as a basis for personal morality but also as a basis for law. As he sees it, a just constitution aims at harmonizing each individual's freedom with that of everyone else. It has nothing to do with maximizing utility, which "must on no account interfere" with the determination of basic rights. Since people "have different views on the empirical end of happiness and what it consists of," utility can't be the basis of justice and rights. Why not ? Because resting rights on utility would require the society to affirm or endorse one conception of happiness over others. To base the constitution on one particular conception of happiness (such as that of the majority) would impose on some the values of others. It would fail to respect the right of each person to pursue his or her own ends. "No one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others," Kant writes, "for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others" to do the same. 
   A second distinctive feature of Kant's political theory is that it derives justice and rights from a social contract---but a social contract with a puzzling twist. Earlier contract thinkers, including Locke, argued that legitimate government arises from a social contract among men and women who, at one time or another, decide among themselves on the principles that will govern their collective life. Kant sees the contract differently.  Although legitimate government must be based on an original contract, "we need by no means assume that this contract . . . actually exists as a fact, for it cannot possibly be so." Kant maintains that the original contract is not actual but imaginary.
    Why derive a just constitution from an imaginary contract rater than a real one ? One reason is practical : It's often hard to prove historically, in the distant history of nations, that any social contract ever took place. A second reason is philosophical : Moral principles can't be derived from empirical facts alone. Just as the moral law can't rest on the interests or desires of individuals, principles of justice can't rest on the interests or desires of a community. The mere fact that a group of people in the past agreed to a constitution is not enough to make that constitution just.
   What kind of imaginary contract could possibly avoid this problem ? Kant simply calls it "an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality ; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation," and obligate each citizen "as if he had consented." Kant concludes that this imaginary act of collective consent "is the test of the rightfulness of every public law." 
   Kant didn't tell us what this imaginary contract would look like or what principles of justice it would produce. Almost two centuries later, an American political philosopher, John Rawls, would try to answer these questions. 
   This concludes the discussion, in chief, of Immanuel Kant. Now, on to my main man, John Rawls.